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Abstract
The paper examines the impact of industrial protection, agricultural export taxes, and
overvaluation of the exchange rate on the balance between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. A variety of agricultural terms-of-trade indices are constructed to
measure the policy bias against agriculture in a general equilibrium framework that
incorporates traded and non-traded goods. These general equilibrium measures are compared
to earlier work in a partial equilibrium framework assuming perfect substitutability between
domestic and traded goods. Starting from a stylized computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model of Tanzania, we simulate a 25 percent tariff on non-agriculture and a 25 percent
export tax on agriculture. We also consider the impact of changes in the equilibrium
exchange rate. The results indicate that the partial equilibrium measures miss much of the
action operating through indirect product and factor market linkages, while overstating the
strength of the linkages between changes in the exchange rate and prices of traded goods on
the agricultural terms of trade. 1
1. Introduction
In the early post-World-War-II period, rapid industrialization was widely considered
to be the key to development. Historical and cross-country studies showing the declining
relative weight of the agricultural sector in the transformation process from poor to rich
seemed to reinforce this conclusion, and the view was also central to Marxist analysis in
socialist countries. During this period, many countries pursued a development strategy of
import substituting industrialization (ISI), which included a variety of policy measures such
as: (1) high import tariffs on manufacturing to protect “infant” industries and export taxes
on agriculture; (2) quantitative import controls, when tariff protection was viewed as
providing inadequate protection; and (3) chronically overvalued exchange rates. Measures
directly affecting the agricultural sector were also added, including: (1) agricultural
marketing boards with monopoly powers, (2) centrally set producer and consumer prices, and
(3) input subsidies. The ISI development strategy led to agriculture being both heavily taxed
and neglected relative to industry. 
The neglect of agriculture was heavily criticized in the 1960s (Schultz 1964), but ISI
policies were not effectively criticized for another decade. In a different, complementary
vein, it was later pointed out by Lipton (1977), who coined the term “urban bias”, that the
most important class conflict in poor countries was neither between labor and capital, nor
between foreign and national interests, but between the rural and urban classes. The “Berg
Report” (World Bank 1981) identified inappropriate domestic economic policies as the
fundamental cause of the deepening agricultural crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Getting prices
right” became an influential catch phrase and it was suggested that this policy approach
should be the key piece of advice to policy-makers in troubled economies. The neoclassical
counter-revolution (Toye 1993) had arrived, and price reforms became a central component
in the wide ranging economic reforms which African countries initiated from the mid-1980s
onwards. 
In addition, it gradually became clear to academics and policy makers alike that
whatever the theoretical merits of the variety of interventionist measures employed by
governments, they often led to seriously distorted incentives, inefficiencies, and rent seeking.
The difference between the nominal and effective rates of protection afforded by tariff rates
was analyzed theoretically and scrutinized empirically — and for good reasons. Empirical
work indicated that effective protection of industrial products was often much higher than
indicated by nominal protection rates, and the costs of intervention were shown to be very
high indeed. Other macro policies and their impact on the performance of the agricultural
sector, including the exchange rate, also came into focus. 2
 The findings of a World Bank comparative study during 1987-90 involving 18 countries are
1
reported in Krueger (1992) and Schiff and Valdes (1992). Eight country studies done at the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) from 1981 to 1990 are contained in Bautista and Valdes (1993),
together with regional surveys of the literature in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Empirical studies on the effects of government price interventions in developing
countries, especially those undertaken since the early 1980s, support the view that there was
substantial policy bias against agriculture.  First, producer prices are often found to have
1
been suppressed directly by sector-specific policies, commonly in the form of agricultural
export taxation or the pricing policy of parastatal marketing organizations. Second,
economywide policies, including trade and macroeconomic policies that influence the real
exchange rate, are shown to have had significant indirect effects, invariably adverse, on
agricultural incentives. In most cases, the indirect impact of economywide policies is found
to be more important than the effect of direct government interventions.
In taking into account the additional effect on agricultural incentives arising from
indirect government interventions, these studies have gone beyond the narrow, sectoral
orientation of traditional agricultural policy analysis. However, in general, they have relied
on analytical frameworks that are partial equilibrium. Economists have long recognized that
the partial measures used in applied work are incomplete and that a general equilibrium
framework is needed to capture all the interactions that determine the net relative impact of
a mix of policies on the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. “Policy bias” is inherently
an economywide, general equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, to date there has been no
systematic evaluation of the extent of agricultural bias of government interventions using a
general equilibrium framework. 
Another critical problem with partial equilibrium approaches is that they typically
assume perfect substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods, as well
as between domestic products for export and for internal use. Under these assumptions, we
should never observe two-way trade (“cross hauling”) at the commodity level. If a good is
tradable, the “law of one price” holds and changes in world prices should be completely
translated into changes in domestic prices. Furthermore, the responsiveness of sectoral
domestic prices to changes in world prices or in trade policies does not depend on the shares
of trade in sectoral demand or supply. It matters only that the good is “tradable”, not how
much it is traded.3
 An extended discussion on empirical testing of the law of one price started from an article by
2
Peter Isard (1977); see Ceglowski (1994); Blaffes (1991); and Ardeni (1989).
 Peterson, Hertel, and Stout (1994) consider the violation of the law of one price in the context of
3
a partial equilibrium, multi-commodity, agricultural trade model.
 For a description of this CGE model specification see Deverajan et al. (1997) and de Melo and
4
Robinson (1989).
 For a recent survey on general equilibrium analysis applied to agriculture, see Hertel (1997).
5
All these implications of the law of one price are empirically suspect.  For example,
2
two-way trade is observed in highly disaggregated sectoral data for virtually all countries (de
Melo and Robinson 1981; de Melo and Tarr 1992). Within agriculture in developing
countries, there are also significant shares of non-traded goods or goods with very low trade
shares. In any case, the transmission elasticities vary widely across sectors. Evidence for
major traded agricultural commodities indicates that price transmission elasticities are close
to one for developed countries, although significantly lower for developing countries
(Mundlak and Larson 1992). Ardeni (1989), on the other hand, finds that changes in world
prices or trade policy measures are generally only partially transmitted through to prices of
domestic substitutes.  In general, elasticities of substitution and transformation are much
3
lower for industrial goods in developing countries, especially intermediates and capital
goods. 
By contrast, a widely used specification in multisector, trade-focused, computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models is that imports are imperfect substitutes for domestically
produced goods with the same sectoral classification. Similarly, in many models, exports are
also differentiated from domestically produced goods sold on the domestic market. This
formulation removes the extreme dichotomy between tradable and non-tradable goods,
allowing differing degrees of tradability corresponding to different values of the substitution
and transformation elasticities (which are either infinite or zero in the partial equilibrium
approach, depending on whether the good is traded or not). This specification gives some
realistic autonomy to the domestic price system in the model and can account for cross-
hauling.  
4
In this paper, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that
incorporates the more realistic assumption of imperfect substitutability to provide a
comprehensive framework to capture the various repercussions of policy interventions and
measure their impact on agriculture.  Assuming that the economic environment is
5
characterized by trade policy distortions such as the ones in focus in Krueger, Schiff, and4
 A related measure of government support to agriculture, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE),
6
was developed during the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations and includes both trade and non-trade
policies. It is also a partial equilibrium measure which treats trade basically the same way as the Krueger,
Schiff, Valdes approach (FAO 1975; Josling and Tangermann 1989; Webb et al. 1990). 
Valdes (1988), we will consider the differences between general equilibrium measures of the
agricultural sector bias as compared to the results of partial equilibrium analysis.  Following
6
this introduction, the partial equilibrium measures used in previous work are presented.
Section 3 discusses how the bias against agriculture can be measured in a CGE model (fully
specified in Annex II), and indicates why this frame of reference is preferable to the partial
equilibrium approach. The results of a series of policy experiments designed to provide
answers to the questions raised above are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Agricultural bias: partial equilibrium, no product differentiation
If a country is small and there is perfect substitutability between domestically
produced and imported goods, a change in the import price will — under competitive
conditions — lead to the same change in the domestic producer price of the importable good.
Likewise, if domestic products for export and for internal use are perfect substitutes, the
domestic producer price of the exportable good will be equal to its domestic-currency border
price equivalent. However, in practice, government policies can drive wedges between
foreign and domestic prices. 
Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988) — KSV for short — developed measures of the
impact of these policies on agricultural producer prices. These measures are used to assess
whether the policy-induced incentive structure favors or discriminates against agricultural
production, i.e. whether the sector is protected or not relative to non-agriculture. They
distinguish between policies that have direct and indirect effects on agricultural incentives.
Policies with direct effects include agricultural sector-specific import and export
taxes, price controls, and production taxes and subsidies, all of which affect the wedge
between producer and border prices of agricultural products. Policies with indirect effects
on agricultural incentives, on the other hand, include the exchange rate, which affects the
economywide balance between traded and non-traded goods, and import tariffs on non-
agricultural products. Contrary to the assumption used by KSV, we recognize below the
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Following KSV (but using different notation), let   be the domestic producer
price of a specific tradable agricultural product iag,   the border-price equivalent at the
official exchange rate E  , and   the nonagricultural producer price index defined as the 0
weighted average of non-agricultural producer prices. The relative producer prices of
agricultural products vis-a-vis the non-agricultural aggregate price are given by 
 .
The direct agricultural bias against products indexed by iag is defined as the
proportionate deviation of relative prices from what they would have been without direct
interventions: 
This measure is meant to capture the impact on producer incentives of commodity-specific
policies, and it corresponds to the widely used “nominal protection rate” in the empirical
trade literature.
Let   be the border price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate E*, and
define   as the nonagricultural price index where the tradable part is evaluated at E*,
defined as a situation with a sustainable trade balance and no trade restrictions. In this case,
E* differs from E  to the extent that the current account is set at an unsustainable level and 0
trade interventions are in place. The relative price is given by    where
, and Xt refers to tradable goods (whose price is
evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate, E*) and Xnt refers to non-traded, non-agricultural
goods. 
The indirect agricultural bias against the sector indexed by iag is the proportionate





























 In some of the IFPRI country studies referred to above, trade restrictions (including import
7
tariffs and export taxes) are systematically examined as a major source of real exchange rate distortion; see,
for example, Cavallo and Mundlak (1982) and Bautista (1987), for an empirical investigation of the
Argentine and Philippine cases, respectively.
(3)
(4)
This measure is meant to capture the indirect effects on producer incentives of the exchange
rate disequilibrium (E  differing from E*) and of trade policy affecting   (e.g., industrial 0
protection). Notably,   does not appear in the right-hand side of equation (2). Hence,  
the indirect agricultural bias is the same for all tradable agricultural goods. The implicit
assumption that   and   are independent shows that the partial equilibrium
framework does not capture intersectoral price linkages and also assumes no repercussion
through changes in the exchange rate induced by the price changes.
7
The exchange rate affects the terms-of-trade ratio depending on the shares of traded
and non-traded goods within the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. If all goods in the
economy are tradable, then the exchange rate is irrelevant since, in that case, all domestic
relative prices are set by world prices. The exchange rate is important precisely because there
are non-traded goods. In the KSV studies, the agricultural products considered were tradable
(i.e., some observed exports or imports) and some non-agricultural goods were not tradable.
In that environment, exchange rate changes affect tradable agriculture much more than
partially non-traded non-agriculture. Considering agriculture as a whole, it is important to
consider non-traded agricultural goods in defining aggregate terms-of-trade indices. 
The total agricultural bias against sector iag can be represented by the proportionate
deviation of   from  :
which captures the effects of both direct and indirect government interventions. 
The three measures are related as follows:PMi ’ pwmi 1 % tmi EXR and







The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is a modified measure of the
direct agricultural bias, which is usually smaller (in absolute value) than the nominal
protection rate since   is typically less than   in developing countries.
In contrast with the partial equilibrium measures used in the World Bank studies,
which are concerned with producer price incentives only, a general equilibrium approach will
capture intersectoral resource shifts, product differentiation in production and demand, and
the effect of induced price changes on the equilibrium exchange rate. The result is a richer
specification of the price system and a more complete concept of agricultural bias. 
3. Agricultural bias: general equilibrium and product differentiation
If domestically produced and imported goods (DC and M respectively) are imperfect i    i
substitutes, the price of the domestic good, PDC , will no longer be equal to the domestic- i
currency price of the import substitute, PM , as in the partial equilibrium framework. i
Similarly, if there is imperfect substitutability between domestic products for export (e) and i
for internal use, their prices — PE and PDA respectively — will not be identical. It follows i    i
that the domestic prices of exported and imported products are not determined by the law of
one price.
3.1. Structure of the applied CGE approach
Following Armington (1969), we can introduce product differentiation by defining
a composite good Q which is a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function of the i
domestic product DC and the import substitute M . Likewise, a production good X can be i          i            i
defined as a CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function of the domestic product in
sector i for internal use DA and for export E . Under the small country assumption, i.e., the i        i
country's imports have an infinitely elastic world supply and its exports have an infinitely
elastic world demand, world prices of imports pwm and of exports PWE are exogenously i        i
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respectively, where EXR is the exchange rate (in domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency), and tm and te are the implicit tariff and export tax rates, respectively, that take i    i
account of the legal tariffs and export taxes as well as any quantitative trade restrictions and
direct price controls that affect the disparity between the domestic and border prices of traded
goods.
From the underlying general equilibrium model used here (see Annex II for a
complete specification), the relationships between relative prices and quantities are:
We use the convention that CES and CET refer to “constant elasticity of substitution” and
“constant elasticity of transformation” functions, while CES* and CET* refer to the
corresponding first-order conditions for utility maximization and profit maximization.
Sectoral composite good prices are the weighted averages of the domestic prices of
their component products:
where the CES and CET functions refer to cost functions relating the composite prices to
their component prices. They reflect the first-order conditions described above. 
Equations 5 - 10 are imbedded in the structure of a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model incorporating differentiated products. This model permits the determination
of the direct effects of government interventions (captured in tm and te) on agricultural i    i9
prices, and also their indirect effects through intersectoral linkages and induced changes in
the exchange rate.
To make the CGE agricultural bias results derived in this study as comparable as
possible to the partial measures described above, we adapt the CGE model to provide a
“clean” theoretical starting point for measuring policy bias and also use the framework for
doing controlled experiments that isolate particular effects. 
First, in the model, factor markets have been segmented with respect to aggregate
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Labor and capital can move between sectors within
agriculture and non-agriculture, but cannot move between agriculture and non-agriculture.
In this model, the derived agricultural sector bias measures reflect only price changes and
intra-sectoral resource shifts. The partial equilibrium measures focus only on prices, and so
indicate potential resource pulls if factors were free to move between agriculture and non-
agriculture. In the CGE model, by restricting factor mobility between agriculture and non-
agriculture, the resulting equilibrium prices, and measures of bias based on them, should be
comparable to the partial equilibrium measures. In an “unrestricted” CGE model, allowing
inter-aggregate-sector factor mobility, adjustment would include both price and quantity
effects. In general, allowing quantity adjustment will reduce price adjustment, so the
segmentation should lead to price effects which are upper bounds. Indeed, the most
appropriate measure of bias would be to allow full factor mobility and measure changes in
value added across sectors with removal (or addition) of distorting policies. 
Second, as the base for our experiments, we create a distortion-free benchmark
solution of the model to provide the theoretically best reference point for the analysis. As
reflected in our preliminary data, the economy has a variety of distorting taxes — sectoral
tariffs and domestic indirect taxes. Given these existing distortions, analysis of policy
experiments is made difficult because there are potential “second best” effects from
imposition of new taxes. Given our focus on comparing measures of policy bias, it is
convenient to start from an undistorted base. To achieve this undistorted economic
environment, all production, sales, and trade taxes in the base data are removed. The lost
revenue is made up by means of a non-distorting, lump-sum income tax on households,
yielding the base value of government revenue — the standard approach in public finance
models. This undistorted base solution is the starting point against which we compare  all our
experiments. 
Third, the general equilibrium model incorporates the indirect effect of changes in
tariffs and export subsidies on the economy through their impact on the equilibrium
exchange rate — an indirect effect ignored in the partial equilibrium approach. To isolate this
effect, we run a variant of the tariff and export subsidy experiments in which we fix the10
 In fact, in most of their country studies, overvaluation was the greatest source of policy bias
8
against agriculture. 
 See Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1993) for a discussion of the real exchange rate in this
9
class of CGE models. 
exchange rate, and so “turn off” this mechanism. In order to fix the exchange rate, we have
specified a different macro “closure” and assumed that the trade balance adjusts
endogenously. 
Fourth, in the KSV methodology, overvaluation of the exchange rate is a major
source of policy bias against agriculture.  In a general equilibrium context, EXR represents
8
the equilibrium exchange rate that is jointly determined by the remaining variables of the
model, including especially the balance of trade. The equilibrium exchange rate
corresponding to a situation with no trade distortion and a “sustainable” (perhaps zero) trade
balance E* can be calculated with the CGE model, which provides a unified framework
incorporating all relative prices, including the real exchange rate. Unlike KSV, no separate
model is required to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate. To measure the effect of
changes in the exchange rate only (i.e., with no changes in distorting sectoral taxes), we
report on a set of additional experiments where we systematically reduce the trade balance
to zero, and solve for the resulting equilibrium exchange rates, and all other prices and
quantities. The results show the sensitivity of the various agricultural terms-of-trade
measures with respect to depreciation of the exchange rate arising from the elimination of
the trade deficit. 
Finally, since the focus of the analysis is on the production rather than the
consumption side, the non-traded producer price index of goods sold on the domestic market
has been chosen as the numeraire of the model. For this choice, the solution value of the
exchange rate measures the relative price of traded goods to non-traded goods — the “real”
exchange rate of trade theory.  In public finance models, it is common to use the consumer
9
price index as numeraire, which is convenient for welfare analysis. The choice is only a
matter of convenience. The model is a neoclassical general equilibrium model and only
determines relative prices.


































As discussed in the introduction, a major shortcoming of the partial equilibrium
approach is the assumed complete transmission of world price changes to domestic prices.
Figure 1 shows the price links in the CGE model. Domestic prices of exported and imported
products are determined by world market prices plus any trade taxes (given the small country
assumption). However, domestic sectoral producer prices (PX) are CET cost functions of
export prices (PE) and domestic prices (PDA, PDC). Similarly, the composite good prices
(PQ) are CES cost functions of import prices (PM) and domestic prices. The strength of price
transmission effects depends both on elasticities (of substitution and transformation) and on
trade shares. There are also links working through intermediate inputs, which include
imported and domestic goods, and finally to factor prices. In this model, the policy bias
against agriculture will depend on differences in policies, trade shares, and the degree of















































3.2. Measures and policy experiments in the CGE framework
In the general equilibrium approach used here, the measure of agricultural bias is
captured through various measures of the terms of trade between aggregate agriculture and
aggregate non-agriculture. They are defined as the ratio of the relevant price indices. For
example, the agricultural terms of trade with respect to gross output X in domestic producer
prices can be represented as follows:
where
The share parameters are the gross output shares of individual sub-sectors in the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors. The sum of these shares within each aggregate sector equals
one.
The aggregate sectoral producer price indices are defined as:
The terms-of-trade measures within the CGE framework are constructed using the
following prices and corresponding quantity weights: 
PM M domestic market price and quantity of imports
PE E domestic market price and quantity of exports
PQ Q composite good price and quantity
PX X producer price and gross output
PVA X value added price and quantity
Agricultural bias in the CGE framework is measured by various agricultural terms-of-
trade indices:













 The SAM is based on preliminary and incomplete data for Tanzania. A major work program is
10
underway to improve the data base. See Wobst (1998) for a description of an updated 1992 SAM. Note
that the reported economic structure is for the distortion-free base solution of the model. 
Agricultural TOT regarding PE and E.
Agricultural TOT regarding PQ and Q
Agricultural TOT regarding PX and X
Agricultural TOT regarding PVA and X
A 28 sector — of which 13 are agricultural sectors — social accounting matrix
(SAM) for Tanzania (base year 1990) provides the starting data base for our policy
simulations.  Given that the data are preliminary and that we start from a distortion-free base
10
solution, the model should be seen as reflecting a “stylized” version of a Tanzania-like
economy. The SAM was developed as part of a research project which is developing
comparative SAM data for a number of African countries, including: Botswana, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The model can be
seen as characterizing a highly-agricultural, trade-dependent, developing country. 
The structure of the economy is presented in Table 1, which provides sector-specific
information on production, value-added, and trade shares; export and import ratios with
respect to total production and absorption; and elasticities of substitution and transformation.
The characteristics of this economic structure that significantly influence the results of the
analysis can be summarized as follows: 
• The share of agriculture in total gross production is 42 percent, and 56 percent in
value-added at market prices. This economy is dominated by agriculture.
• The share of agriculture in total exports is only 26 percent, but the two most
important agricultural export sectors (coffee and tea) have export-production ratios
of around 80 percent. Most exports are non-agricultural, but there are some very
export-dependent agricultural sectors. 
• There are virtually no agricultural imports. Most imports are intermediate and capital
goods for which elasticities of substitution with domestic production is low. One
sector, “fuel”, which includes petrochemicals, has high import and export ratios,
indicating the existence of “pass-through” exports.14
Table 1: Structure of the Model Economy
Composition (%) Ratios (%) Elasticities
X VA EX IM EX/X IM/Q SIGT SIGC
Cotton 0.5 0.3 - - - - - -
Sisal 0.3 0.3 0.8 - 22.6 - 3.0 -
Tea 0.2 0.2 2.6 - 79.7 - 3.0 -
Coffee 0.8 0.8 9.7 - 82.9 - 2.0 -
Sugar 0.4 0.3 1.4 - 27.8 - 3.0 -
Tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.8 - 53.2 - 3.0 -
Cashew 0.1 0.1 0.7 - 46.5 - 3.0 -
Pyrethrum 0.1 0.1 0.5 - 44.1 - 3.0 -
Maize 7.5 10.7 1.5 - 1.5 - 3.0 -
Wheat 0.1 0.2 - 0.0 - 5.4 - 4.0
Paddy 1.9 2.8 - - - - - -
Other Agri. 21.8 29.3 5.4 0.1 1.8 0.1 3.0 1.1
Livestock 8.0 11.3 2.2 0.1 2.0 0.2 3.0 1.1
Mining 1.5 1.8 1.4 6.7 6.7 44.9 1.1 4.0
Food & Bever. 5.4 3.2 4.9 7.1 6.5 21.2 1.1 4.0
Textiles 5.8 4.0 27.3 7.8 33.5 25.2 4.0 1.1
Fuel 0.1 0.1 0.8 4.8 62.4 95.7 1.1 0.8
Other Chemicals 0.9 0.6 0.9 9.5 6.5 64.5 1.1 0.8
Non-Metal 1.0 0.4 1.5 3.5 10.7 40.1 1.1 0.8
Metal 2.2 1.4 2.9 31.9 9.5 73.2 1.1 0.8
T&M Equipment 2.1 2.5 0.1 22.4 0.2 64.1 1.1 0.8
Electr. & Water 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 4.0 1.1
Construction 5.4 1.5 - 0.0 - 0.1 - 4.0
Commerce 16.6 12.3 21.0 0.3 9.0 0.3 4.0 1.1
Trans. & Comm 5.9 8.3 4.8 0.4 5.8 1.3 4.0 1.1
Financial Inst. 4.7 5.6 - 0.9 - 3.2 - 4.0
Other Services 0.7 0.7 8.6 4.4 83.2 85.6 1.1 4.0
Public Admin. 4.9 0.8 0.1 - 0.2 - 4.0 -
Total/Avg. AG 41.8 56.4 25.7 0.2 3.4 0.1 - -
T./Avg. non-AG 58.2 43.6 74.3 99.8 8.7 23.3 - -
Notes: X = Output, VA = Value-Added, EX = Exports, IM = Imports, Q = Absorption, 
SIGT = Elasticity of Transformation, and SIGC = Elasticity of Substitution.
Source: Distortion-free base solution of the CGE model for Tanzania using a preliminary 1990 SAM (Wobst
1998). 15
 Other government policies such as sales taxes or fixed producer prices could also be
11
investigated within the CGE framework. However, in the present analysis, we focus on trade policy-
induced distortions.
Four experiments are carried out to simulate the impact of introducing significant
industrial protection and taxation of agricultural exports, with and without a fixed exchange
rate.  The first experiment simulates an “import substitution industrialization” (ISI) strategy
11
by imposing a 25 percent import tariff (tm(iagn) = 25%) on all non-agricultural imports. This
sort of ISI strategy should hurt agriculture by: (a) raising the relative price of non-agricultural
goods, which are import substitutes, compared to agriculture; (b) increasing the costs of
production in agriculture (since non-agricultural commodities are used as intermediate inputs
in agriculture); and (c) inducing an appreciation of the exchange rate which will hurt export-
oriented agricultural sectors producing tradable goods.
The induced appreciation of the exchange rate represents an indirect effect which is
considered to be independent in the partial equilibrium approach to measuring agricultural
bias. To estimate the separate effect of this appreciation, in experiment 2 we also increase
the non-agricultural tariff as in experiment 1, but fix the exchange rate, which serves to
isolate the indirect exchange-rate effect. With the exchange rate fixed, the model is solved
by endogenously adjusting the trade balance (as discussed above). This additional experiment
allows comparison with the partial equilibrium measures which analyze the effects of
taxation under the assumption of a fixed exchange rate. 
The third and fourth experiments simulate the implementation of a 25 percent tax on
all agricultural exports, again with a free and fixed exchange rate (te(iag) = 25% and EXR
is either free or fixed). The impact of an export tax on agriculture in a partial equilibrium
framework with a fixed exchange rate is referred to as the direct bias against agriculture. In
the general equilibrium framework, the effect of an export tax can be divided into two
components: (a) price changes due to trade price transmission effects, given the CES-CET
functional structure of the model; and (b) price changes due to the induced exchange-rate
effect.
In the partial equilibrium literature, a major source of policy bias is the overvaluation
of the exchange rate, even with no sectoral price distortions. To assess this effect, we
perform a series of five experiments where we leave all sectoral taxes at zero but reduce the
base value of the trade balance in 20 percent increments, reaching zero in the last experiment.














 We could also have fixed (and varied) the exchange rate and “closed” the model by solving for
12
the corresponding equilibrium trade balances endogenously. The qualitative results would be the same —
we trace out the functional relationship between the real exchange rate and the balance of trade. 
balance.  A trade balance of zero is often specified as defining the “appropriate” equilibrium
12
value of the exchange rate in the partial equilibrium literature. Defining an equilibrium or
“sustainable” trade balance is a macro issue, outside the scope of our static general
equilibrium model. In the CGE model, there is a functional relationship between the
exchange rate and the trade balance, and hence between the trade balance and measures of
policy bias arising from changes in the equilibrium exchange rate. The five experiments
indicate this relationship. 
4. Results
4.1. Industrial protection and agricultural export taxes
Table 2 presents the impact on the various agricultural terms-of-trade measures of the
imposition of the 25 percent non-agriculture import and agriculture export taxes, with and
without a fixed exchange rate. The agricultural terms-of-trade measures and their underlying
aggregate price indices are shown in the rows. The first two agricultural terms-of-trade
measures with regard to traded goods (  and  ) capture price-incentive effects
which are close to the partial equilibrium measure. The last three measures ( ,  ,
and  ) capture the transmission of price changes from traded goods through
commodity, output, and value-added prices, reflecting general equilibrium linkages, the
Armington specification of imperfect substitutability, and finally the operation of factor
markets. 
The last row shows that the exchange rate, which is fixed in experiments 2 and 4,
appreciates by approximately 5 percent in experiment 1 and depreciates by 5 percent in
experiment 3. The signs of the induced changes are predictable from theory — the





















































Industrial Protection and Export Taxes in Agriculture
with Free and Fixed Exchange Rate
Price Indices tm(iagn) tm(iagn) & te(iag) te(iag) &
(Base=100)  = 25 % EXR fix  = 25 %  EXR fix
80.0 80.0 100.0 100.0
94.7 100.0 105.3 100.0
118.3 125.0 105.3 100.0
100.0 100.0 75.0 75.0
94.7 100.0 78.9 75.0
94.7 100.0 105.3 100.0
94.4 90.2 93.9 98.8
98.9 96.9 96.8 99.3
104.7 107.3 103.1 100.5
98.3 94.9 93.7 98.0
98.7 96.9 96.2 98.5
100.4 102.2 102.7 100.6
100.1 96.0 92.4 97.5
98.1 96.1 95.8 98.4
98.0 100.1 103.7 100.9
EXR 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.00
The first agricultural terms-of-trade measure ( ) shows a 20 percent
deterioration for experiment 2 due to the 25 percent increase of the non-agricultural price
index  . World market prices in equation 5 are fixed in all experiments, given the small-
country assumption, and the exchange rate is fixed as part of experiment 2. In the first two
experiments, the 25 percent increase in import tariffs on non-agricultural production




























































experiment 2, with a fixed exchange rate, the tariff directly increases  while agricultural
import prices remain unchanged. In experiment 1, the induced appreciation of the exchange
rate changes all import prices, leaving relative prices and hence the agricultural terms of
trade, unchanged. Experiments 3 and 4, in which the domestic prices of agricultural exports
are changed, have no influence on   (as can be seen from equation 5). With a fixed
exchange rate, the export tax does not affect domestic import prices. Moreover, with a
flexible exchange rate, as in experiment 1,   and   change proportionately, leaving
the terms of trade unaffected.
Tracing the effects of the four experiments on   is equivalent to tracing the
effects on  as shown above. A 25 percent export tax on all agricultural sectors leads
(see equation 6) to a decrease in   of 25 percent in experiment 4, where the exchange rate
is fixed. Since   remains unchanged,   decreases by 25 percent. With a flexible
exchange rate (in experiment 3), the depreciation of the exchange rate following the relative
price decrease of exports affects   and   equally and therefore has no additional
effect on  . Experiments 1 and 2 have no influence on  , as can be seen from
equation 6. With a fixed exchange rate, the import tariff does not affect domestic export
prices. With a flexible exchange rate, the induced appreciation in experiment 1 leads to the
same relative changes of   and  .
We now turn to the impact of the experiments series on  ,  , and  .
The third measure of the agricultural terms of trade ( ) is defined with respect to
composite good prices and captures the Armington specification, i.e. the imperfect
substitutability between imports and domestic products (equation 9). The imposition of a 25
percent non-agricultural import tariff reduces   to 90.2 percent when the exchange rate
is fixed. The composite good price index of non-agricultural commodities ( ), which is
effected by domestic import prices (PM) as well as domestic supply prices (PDC), increases
by only 7.3 percent instead of the 25 percent increase of  . For a “semi-tradable” good,
both the import share and the substitution elasticity affect how changes in import prices are





























The agricultural price index drops to 96.9 percent. When the exchange rate is free,
these effects are dampened and   drops to only 94.4 percent. The effect of not allowing
the exchange rate feedback on   amounts to 4.2 percent points. Allowing exchange rate
flexibility means that agriculture gets hurt less.
The 25 percent export tax on agricultural commodities affects the composite good
price index of agriculture by only 0.7 percent due to the limited magnitude of agricultural
exports as compared to domestic supply — most of agriculture is not traded. When exchange
rate feedback is allowed, EXR depreciates and the agricultural composite good price index
drops while non-agriculture gains. The net result is that the export tax affects 
relatively little when the exchange rate is fixed, but substantially more — and negatively —
with a flexible exchange rate.
The fourth agricultural terms-of-trade measure ( ) is defined with respect to
producer prices (px), reflecting the imperfect transformation between domestic produce and
exports in the CET function. The 25 percent import tariff in experiments 1 and 2 lowers 
in a similar way as  . Moreover, allowing for exchange rate flexibility results in an
appreciation of the exchange rate and improves   compared to the fixed exchange rate
scenario. This result is a reflection of the very large share of non-traded agricultural products
in total agriculture, which implies that aggregate agriculture is favored when the exchange
rate appreciates. In addition, the price index of non-agricultural producer prices is higher
under a fixed exchange rate. 
In sum,   is 98.3 percent under a flexible exchange rate and 94.9 percent under
a fixed exchange rate. In case of the 25 percent export tax on agricultural products in
experiments 3 and 4, the agricultural terms of trade are affected more under a flexible
exchange rate than under a fixed exchange rate, while the direct impact of the export tax
appears relatively limited. The depreciation following the imposition of the export tax in
experiment 3 has a negative influence on the agricultural terms of trade  . This result
again is linked to the high share of non-traded agriculture, which is hurt in relative terms by
a depreciation. In the partial equilibrium literature, most agricultural commodities are treated
as perfectly substitutable tradable goods for which eliminating an overvaluation of the








































































Changes in the terms of trade in value-added prices   provide the most
appropriate bias measure because it indicates relative incentives to “pull” productive factors
between sectors. A non-agricultural tariff combined with a flexible exchange rate slightly
improves the terms of trade of agriculture, whereas agriculture is hurt in relative terms under
a fixed exchange rate. As noted above, agriculture is relatively non-traded, and therefore
benefits from an appreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, in the export tax experiment,
exchange rate flexibility implies that   drops compared to the situation with fixed
exchange rate.
4.2. Impacts of an overvaluation of the exchange rate
The results of the experiment series in which we gradually reduce the trade balance
to zero are reported in Figures 2, 3, and 4. 
Figure 2 shows that the trade balance is eliminated in five consecutive steps, resulting
in exchange rate depreciations starting at almost 4 percent at the beginning and declining to
about 1 percent at the last step. Elimination of the trade deficit leads to a depreciation of 10
percent. The corresponding adjustments in real imports and exports are shown in Figure 3.
Imports move very little while exports increase by around 130 percent — the improvement
of the balance of payments is mainly a consequence of export performance. The import-
dependent nature of the economy, with high trade shares and low substitution elasticities for
intermediates and capital goods, makes it difficult to reduce imports. They even increase a































Real Output for Some AG Sectors













































 The development of the relative export shares of total agriculture and non-agriculture
13
throughout the experiment series is shown in Figure 6 and 7 of Annex I.
result, which is typical of many developing countries, underlines the need to maintain
imports at an adequate level if export promotion is to succeed.
13
Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates that although the last three agricultural terms of trade
indices fall as the exchange rate depreciates, the changes are small — under 5 percent. The
first two indices,   and  , do not change since changes in the exchange rate effect
agriculture and non-agriculture symmetrically. The other three agricultural terms-of-trade
measures ( ,  , and  ) decrease in the beginning due to the induced
depreciation of the exchange rate. However, the effect tapers off in the middle of the
experiment series, and the measures improve a little at the end. The turnaround is due to the
fact that agricultural exports increase with depreciation and, by the last two experiments in
the series, grow to be a significant share of agricultural output. With depreciation, traded
agriculture becomes more important as can be seen from Figure 5.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the extent of the policy bias against agriculture in a general
equilibrium framework. Various measures of the agricultural terms of trade are constructed
to assess the impact of industrial protection, agricultural export taxes, and overvaluation of
the exchange rate on the balance between agriculture and non-agriculture. The general22
equilibrium measures are compared with earlier work measuring policy bias in a partial
equilibrium framework. 
Our results indicate that trade policies — in particular, 25 percent non-agricultural
tariffs and 25 percent agricultural export taxes — have a significant but much lower negative
impact on relative prices in agriculture than would be indicated by partial equilibrium
measures. The general equilibrium framework captures indirect effects of trade policies that
work through induced changes in the equilibrium exchange rate — an effect that is not
captured in partial equilibrium analysis. We use the model to compute the empirical
importance of this indirect effect, which is potentially significant. The imposition of a non-
agricultural tariff with a fixed exchange rate leads to a much stronger deterioration of the
terms-of-trade measures as compared to a flexible exchange rate scenario since the
appreciation of the exchange rate actually benefits agriculture. The imposition of an export
tax on all agricultural sectors with a fixed exchange rate leads to a much lower deterioration
as compared to a flexible exchange rate scenario since the export tax induced depreciation
of the exchange rate hurts the relatively non-traded aggregate agriculture in the case of a
flexible exchange rate.
A separate series of experiments is carried out to assess the impact of overvaluation
of the exchange rate — characteristic of many developing countries. In earlier work in a
partial equilibrium framework, comparative work in a number of countries identified
exchange rate overvaluation as the largest source of policy bias. In a general equilibrium
framework incorporating non-traded goods and imperfect substitutability between domestic
and foreign goods, these results are seriously qualified. 
In our archetype model of Tanzania, agriculture has a large share of non-traded goods
and traded non-agriculture goods have relatively low substitution elasticities. These
characteristics reflect many developing countries. In this environment, we find a much
smaller impact on agriculture of depreciating the exchange rate than is indicated by partial
equilibrium measures. Actually, our results are contrary to the “conventional wisdom” that
a depreciation benefits agriculture. General equilibrium effects are indeed important. 
This paper deals only with trade policies and their impact on aggregate agriculture.
It is straightforward to expand the analysis to include sector-specific domestic tax and
subsidy policies and their impacts on particular agricultural sectors. The CGE model is an
appropriate analytical framework for such analysis. 23
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Annex I: Export shares
An explanation of the applied sector abbreviations is presented in Table 1.1. of Annex II27
Annex II: CGE model equations
Table 1.1. Definition of Model Indices, Parameters, and Variables
Indices
i, j Sectors Cotton (Cott) Processed Food, Beverages
Sisal (Sisa)    & Tobacco (Bevt)
Tea (Tea) Textiles (Text)
Coffee (Coff) Petroleum (Fuel)
Sugar (Suga) Other Chemicals (Oche)
Tobacco (Toba) Non-metal Products (Inxm)
Cashew (Cash) Metal products (Meti)
Pyrethrum (Pyre) Transport & Mach. Equ. (Tmeq)
Maize (Maiz) Electricity & Water (Elwa)
Wheat (Whea) Construction (Cnst)
Paddy (Padd) Commerce (Comm)
Other Agriculture (Othe) Transport & Communication (Tr_c)
Livestock, Forestry, Fishing Financial Institutions (Fi_i)
   & Hunting (Lffh) Other Services (Oser)
Mining (Mine) Public Administration (Pa_d)






Livestock, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting





f Factors of Agriculture Rural Paid labor  Urban Prof & Tech & Supervisor
production Urban Unskilled Paid labor  Land
Urban Production & Transport & Manual Capital
Urban Clerical & Sales & Services Government Capital
hh, h Households Rural Farmer Rural Non-farmer






































































































Parameters (in lower case)
Armington function shift parameter
CES shift parameter
CES factor share parameter 




Armington function share parameter
  Factors to household map
CET function share parameter
gdtot0 Initial real government spending
Government consumption shares
ids0 Initial total demand for investment
Shares of investment by sector of destination
Make matrix coefficients
World market price of imports (in US$)
Non-traded producer price weights
Armington function exponent




  Share of enterprise income to households
Enterprise shares of factor income
Consumption tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates 
Tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates on exports
Household tax rate
Tariff rates on imports
Indirect tax rates
Initial factor price sectoral proportionality ratios
Variables (in upper case)
Final demand for private consumption
Household consumption / disposable income
Consumption tax revenue
Domestic activity sales
Domestic commodity sales                      
Volume of investment by sector of destination 
Inventory investment by sector                





Export subsidy payments                       
Exchange rate (TShs. per US$)  
Exports                                       
Government foreign borrowing                  
Factor demand by sector
Labor transfers abroad                        
Net foreign savings                           
Factor supply 
Factor supply  in agriculture
Fixed capital investment                       
Total volume of government consumption
Final demand for government consumption 
Government savings                            
Government transfers to Households
Government revenue                             
Household savings                       
Household tax revenue                          
Final demand for productive investment
Total final demand for investment
Indirect tax revenue                          
Intermediates uses                            
Total investment                              
Marginal propensity to save by Household
Imports                                        
Consumption price of composite goods
Domestic activity goods price
Domestic commodity goods price
Domestic price of exports
Non-traded producer price index  
Price of capital goods by sector of destination
Domestic price of imports
Price of composite good 
Value-added price 
World price of exports
Average output price 
Composite goods supply                            
Remittances 
Enterprise remittances
Total savings                                 
Tariff revenue
Slack variable
Factor price sectoral proportionality ratios
Factor price sectoral proportionality ratios for
agricultural sectors
Average factor price 
Domestic output                              
Enterprise income
Factor income
Household income      PMi ’ pwmi@ (1% tmi) @EXR








































































3 Definition of commodity prices
4 Composite good prices
5 Producer prices
6 Consumer prices
7 Value-added prices net of in. taxes 
8 Composite capital good prices
9
 
Non-traded producer price index
Note that exogenous variables in the model, like  , are over-lined.
Table 1.3. Quantity Equations
# Equation Description
10 CES production function
11
Demand function for primary factors (profit
maxamization)
12 Factor market segmentation for iag 0 i
13 Total intermediate use
14 Commodity/activity relationship
15
Gross domestic output as a composite good




































syentf @YFCTRf % REMITENT@EXR
YHhh ’ ’
f
fmaphh,f @ (1& syentf) @YFCTRf
% sremithh @ (REMIT& FLABTF) @EXR % stranshh@GOVTH
% syenthhh @ (YENT& ENTTAX& ENTSAV& ENTTF@EXR)
















ENTTAX ’ ETR @YENT
Table 1.3. Quantity Equations (cont.)
30
# Equation Description
16 Gross dom. output for ien 0 i
17 Export supply
18
Total supply of composite good - Armington
function for im 0 i
19 Total supply for imn 0 i
20
F.O.C for cost minimization for composite
good for im 0 i











30 Enterprise taxesENTSAV ’ ESR@YENT
HHSAV ’ j
h
MPSh @YHh@ (1& thh)
GR ’ TARIFF % CONTAX % INDTAX % HHTAX
% FBOR@EXR % ENTTAX % EXPTAX




GDi ’ glesi @GDTOT
GR ’ ’
i
PCi @ GDi % GOVSAV % GOVTH





















PWEi@Ei % FSAV % FBOR % REMIT
% ENTTF & FLABTF % REMITENT











37 Government savings 
38 Fixed investment
39 Real fixed investment by sector of
destination
40 Investment final demand by sector
of origin
41 Total final investment demand
Table 1.6. Market clearing
# Equation Description
42 Goods market equilibrium (eq)
43 Factor market eq for iagn 0 i
44 Factor market eq for iag 0 i
45 External balanceSAVING ’ INVEST % WALRAS
IDS ’ ids0
GDTOT ’ gdtot0
Table 1.6. Market Clearing Conditions (cont.)
32
# Equation Description
 The model is square and satisfies Walras' law. The set of market clearing equations is
14
functionally dependent, and one can be dropped. Instead of dropping an equation, we add a “slack”
variable to the savings-investment equation (WALRAS in equation 46). This specification is convenient for
checking model consistency, since WALRAS should always equal zero. 
46   
14 Saving- investment balance
Table 1.7. Macro economic closures
# Equation Description
47 Fix total real investment
48 Fix real government spending33
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